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Abstract Many have bowed before the recently acquired
powers of ‘new technologies’. However, in the shift from
tekhne¯ to tekhnologia, it seems we have lost human values.
These values are communicative in nature as technological
progress has placed barriers like distance, web pages and
‘miscellaneous extras’ between individuals. Certain values,
like the interpersonal pleasures of rendering service, have
been lost as their domain of predilection has for many
become fully commercially oriented, dominated by the
cadence of profitability. Though the popular cultures of the
artificial have surged forth to deliver us from the twentieth
century, they have enabled some very superfluous dream-
ing—Man has succumbed to the Godly role of simulating
himself and creating other beings. Communication is
replaced by machines, services are rendered via many
automated devices, procreation has entered the public
sphere, robots and entertainment agents educate our youth
and mesmerising screen-integrating ‘forms of intelligence’
even think for us. As such, this so-called culture threatens
the very values Man constructed in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries to guide himself into the future. But
what if the phenomena mentioned just reflect our new
values? The author presents an investigation into this cul-
tural shift, its impact on human practices with regards the
mind and the body and evokes some pros and cons of
generally accepting the ‘Culture of the Artificial’.
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1 Introduction
When it comes to the production of artefacts, our envi-
ronment—rich with technical objects—turns us into arte-
facts; in the current context, our pathological obsession on
technological conformism may lead one to think of oneself
as an artefact (during an invited (2011) talk in French
entitled ‘‘La communication transhumaniste? Discerne-
ments et de´fis’’ at the 1st Conference of the French Tran-
shumanistic Society, I gave examples of this logic which
actually stem from Schmidt 2005, 2006 and 2007). This
may sound strange but people do indeed generally try to
remodel their daily lives, capabilities and appearances to
keep up with others around them, as just anyone may
notice. Question: Should biodiversity studies include the
redesigning of Man? Regardless of the way one decides to
answer here, it would seem obvious that man’s simulating
himself has become a culture, or even a religion. The sci-
entific references for new future situations do not often
directly portray this activity as being ritualised. My per-
sonal observation from over the last 15 years allows me to
confirm this tendency about Man’s self-simulation. Cul-
tural variations on such activity do exist and are too
abundant to treat here.
The way I see things, the artefactualisation of the
human species may be considered part of the evolutionary
process. Some may not agree with this statement; for many,
the matter dealt with herein appears ideological or perhaps
irrelevant to down-to-earth daily concerns… for the time
being. I intend to explore the types of arguments put forth
on both sides of the equation in order to illustrate the
incomprehension that exists between the protagonists
responding from opposing viewpoints with regard to the
question of whether or not we should redesign the human
being, a fast growing issue.
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More specifically, I will address issues involving
advanced Artificial Intelligence, Humanoid Robotics and
Transhumanism without wishing to put forth a decision
why we should or should not accept new forms of life
similar to our present state or those that deviate from it.
This said, uprising nations should particularly be wary of
deviant grassroots industrial practices (such as organ
farming or operations that do not reflect the standards of
the Establishment), now and in the future. Since the nature
of body or personhood change is limited in some move-
ments to behavioural or physical aspects, the actual change
seems spectacular (i.e. a smart silicon implant) in com-
parison with changing one’s body through exercise. The
reader will not find any statistics here, just facts and
principles about modifications aiming towards new cre-
ations (i.e. ethically impacted material such as female
feticide are left out as it does not constitute an improve-
ment on the being in question, but rather just an ‘existential
preference’.
2 Techniques for human modification
What this means is that there are basically two approaches
to going about the artefactualisation of the human species.
In fact, the evolutionary process itself has changed and
possibly further diversification of it may come about
especially if humans play a role in guiding evolution. The
current two approaches are separate in that their starting
points are not the same. On the one hand, the robotics-
based approach generally uses many components that are
mechanical in nature (traditional hardware) though there is
a growing tendency to accept organic elements into these
constructions. The reasons for using organic stuffs in the
robotics sphere of intervention in society are various: either
they are less costly, increase functionality, render the
resulting ‘machine’ more lifelike, less harmful to the
environment, or they provide jobs to the local workforce.
On the other hand, the transhumanist approach begins
rebuilding man with one single very familiar component,
the human body—just like yours or mine—assuming it is
fully natural. The idea is to use technological advances to
modify the body or brain in hopes of creating a desired
effect. This could entail introducing various entities into
the body for a variety of reasons: molecules (i.e. using
metabolic control for ‘slimming’, anti-ageing medicine to
stay young or live long), electronic chips (i.e. in the brain
to help one understand better or remember more, in the
eyes to improve sight, etc.), bionics for increased power, or
all other implants.
Perhaps a minor detail would be the difference between
implants and transplants. The former generally take the
currently-used-to state of the individual to one she/he does
not know in order to experience it—picture the average
person having Steve Austin’s bionic ability to lift and
throw heavy objects!—whereas the latter aims at bringing
one back to a state she/he has always been used to but has
recently lost—an elderly person having a hip replacement.
The only similarity between the two is that they both
augment the person’s present state.
Let us get back to the robotics versus transhumanism
distinction. Although different, it is important to point out
that there are similarities: for both approaches, it is the
desired effect that leads to the design of a new or even
novel being, which means there is a certain wilfulness
driving towards a new world. I do not think this drive is
new; it is just the techniques used that may surprise people.
Change is a concept that the notion of Man has always
integrated, this is the reason we are part of the world’s
evolutionary cycle.
But it would seem that this short-term aspect of evolu-
tion is mainly behaviour based, thus there is limited change
to the identity of what it means to be human. The concept
of being human does entail a highly social element to it, as
well as a cultural one: it is not in individually modifying
the bodies of the members of society that one can change
the relationships they enjoy or detest. This said sustained
corporal change over time could well have an effect on
relations in society.
2.1 Difference and the concept of Man
The concept of Man would of course become different, but
to what extent? Perhaps the thing that society is calling out
for here is a concept of humans that is more material in
nature when compared to the current idea of what it is to be
human. The belief that we could/should/must modify our
very own physical existence may mean that the immate-
rial—social, psychological, cultural and spiritual—aspects
of our lives have become less important to us. Would such
a statement be too simplistic or is it part of our new reality?
Those working in advanced Artificial Intelligence, Cogni-
tive Robotics, Neuro-evolution, and transhumanistic-type
technologies generally do not delve into the intricate
questions of love, faith or the respect of the Other in
society, all of which directly concern the human immaterial
sphere. They are not supposed to be intimately concerned
with such matters, nor are other scientific fields. One could
nevertheless be very mistaken in saying that these matters
are not on scientists’ agendas (cf. infra my mention of the
advances towards this in 1. Presuppositions); how could
they ever hope to do better than man if they cannot even
copy these facettes of the human race? We could indeed
conclude for the time being that the concept of being
human today means being more physically human than
100 years ago.
2.2 Relation and the concept of Man
So the concept of Man has evolved. Does this operate on
the relations this concept has with other concepts in its
vicinity? The concepts of Nature and Artefact would be
pertinent to explore here. The fact that we today accept to
tamper with mother nature’s ‘products’ is not new but the
acceptance to direct this action on our physical and cog-
nitive existences has increased exponentially. The place of
nature—highly recognised as essential—in traditional cul-
tures would have diminished. However, one is entitled to
disagree with strong statements, in which case it could only
be said that our relation to nature would have been altered
only slightly. The important matter is in asking why this
change suddenly became necessary and what our new
relation with nature, however, close it is to the last version,
means to us in the future.
As for the link to the concept of artefact, the shift does
seem more radical, although Man has always accepted to
handle his own destiny; hence the expression ‘he is a self-
made man’. The tie between Man and being man-made
has been strengthened in the consciousness of members of
society, perhaps paradoxically. A ‘self-made man’ always
referred to the self-assurance, aspirations, intellectual sta-
mina and other paraphernalia of the purely psychological
composition of the individual whereas now, we are able to
apply it to his physical composition. The imminence of the
merger between robotic products and the physically ori-
ented propositions of transhumanism can now be addres-
sed as more than just an eye-opening thought. If one
prefers lesser-alarming realities for measuring one’s con-
sciousness of the conceptual relation between men and
artefacts, one could examine the simple layman’s example
of the use of steroids: first they were used practically
joyfully, then considered cheating, now they are amal-
gamated to deadliness—and this shift happened over a
relatively short period of time whilst the effects of their
use remained stable. Will our judgement on what can and
what cannot be considered an artefact be this rapidly
affected too?
2.3 Identity and the concept of Man
If the relations among the adjacent concepts in the system
are modified because of human modification becoming
abundant, what does this bring forth for the identity of man
in the ecosystem? Imagine that we welcome this slide
toward the increased physical definition of Man: some
serious interrogations suddenly become visible. The fact
that man would have the opportunity to change the very
concept of himself in this manner, and that this would have
a real effect on his surroundings, proves that homo sapiens
would control his own ‘conceptual environment’ and that
the techniques discussed here would be a mere side effect
of his existence (i.e. other techniques could be used to
sustain the developments sought). This would mean that
individuals really would have obtained an overwhelming
level of power vis-a`-vis their past and vis-a`-vis their
counterparts.
3 Shouldn’t we be against greater human diversity?
In the hypothetical system just described, the weaker are
bound to suffer more. Is this the type of homo sapiens we
wish to become?
The identity of others (and thus Selfhood too) would be
heavily affected in such a world. The identity of the Self
would be equated to a very heady position—practically
Godhood. But today, we do have the ‘magnificent oppor-
tunity’ to actually apply this ill-formed logic to our lives
ourselves.
So should biodiversity include the redesign of man? As I
said, the key to strengthening the argument against modi-
fying Man has to put forth practical ideas on how and why
not to modify man in such an era—many are doing it
(eugenics, implants…), though perhaps not to the point of
becoming cyborgs. The undemocratic nature of such
practice is not stopping people because such an argument
remains quite ideological for most or at least irrelevant to
down-to-earth daily concerns.
The way in which they—the artificial or modified
beings—would seem (too) different from the average
human today is in the values they would, perceivably, be
able to share and apply. Because of the hypothetical dif-
ferences in the importance of (traditional) human values
and their application between original men and the non-
organic originating persons, one may not wish to see these
latter caring for one’s children or for the elderly. One may
have difficulty trusting the moral judgements of a non-
natural neighbour or artificial person. Imagine one’s mul-
tiply implanted neighbour is the judge in a widely mediated
homicide case; this could be a real media ‘scoop’, which
would help picture the situation here. The same would go
for our discovering the judge was a machine.
The practical measures necessary to supporting the view
that biodiversity should not include the redesign of Man
would entail, among other things, avoiding simulation in
all its forms. This measure on simulation could be pre-
sented as just general advice, negotiations for special cases
determined by a set of criteria, or out-right prohibition,
according to the adopted political stance. The important
aspect here is the urgency of the question as simulations are
changing our vision of ourselves and our world.
4 Some reasons for considering greater human
diversity
If we take up the judge example once again, the fact that a
human judge with silicon chip implants in the brain or a
purely robotic judge can be hooked up to all the sources of
jurisprudence possible in a continuous manner may one
day comfort the average citizen in the decision he/it makes.
It goes without saying that the sources the ‘judge’ has
access to will have to be limited to a select official set. If
accepted, this would be a very practical solution.
Those supporting the view that biodiversity should
include redesigning humans have to develop strategies on
the ideological and political levels in order to seriously
further their cause, that of artefactualising humans,
because after all, Man would be an ‘artefactual object’ if he
was remodelled in the ways spoken of above. Furthermore,
our judge example is simply that: an example. One cannot
change society’s strategies on a political level based on a
mere practical example. Those that wish to promote the
vision of a widened biodiversity in which homo sapiens
would be one of the species involved would have to either
directly modify the moral position of humans in the world
equilibrium (difficult?) or show the strategic advantages to
becoming robotic individuals (acceptable?), transhuman or
posthuman (meaningless?). This may help people re-
examine their traditional stances. It may help here if I make
things explicit; the judge example would be a very prac-
tical solution, if accepted by all or by the majority, as long
as average citizens are consulted.
Looking at the transhumanist movement will reveal that
the values put forth, whether one sees them to be accept-
able or not, are done so within the framework of specific
basic conditions according to Bostrom (2005), of Oxford
University: ‘Global Security, Technological Progress,
Wide Access’.1 Any sensible being shares these conditions
and would like to have them protected, so the movement is
not so off-tilt as some might say it to be. Have we not
collectively been tampering with nature for a long time
already? Man has always had the tendency to ‘diversify’ in
one way or another, more on moral grounds than on
physical ones.
Accepting to go along with such change would be a
strategic move if it were to be used to unite people, com-
munities, etc. Allowing only weaker members of society to
better themselves would enable them to gain back their
dignity. But would creating laws prohibiting naturally
endowed persons access to changes be unfair? It is clear
that if the biodiversity of man is to be accepted by the
average citizen, any sensible discourse on the matter would
have use the legal/moral or non-physical level as its
cornerstone.
When one considers the argumentation necessary to
change things, it is tempting to just say that the physical
aspects of human life are quite malleable in comparison
with its non-manifest ‘components’. But Bostrom gives us
an indication of the little our considering transforming
human beings entails and where to look for inspiration to
change mindsets. In his own words,2 he mentions that the
necessary ideals are found outside of our bios. We must
therefore act on our logos to better fathom the advent of
change. It is only if we focus on human reason that we will
be able to accept our own redesign.
5 Dialogue for dealing with the cultural shift
towards the artificial
The reader may find that I fail to correctly transcend the
practical aspects of modifying man to develop sound
arguments on the ideological and political levels of why to
expand human diversity. However, pulling one way or
another was not the goal here. The current discussion in
this area of thought reminds me of Ricœur’s (Changeux
and Ricœur 1998) stance on the impossible adjustment
between our finite body and our reason being infinitely
open. Although the two levels of discourse are comple-
mentary to one another, their refusal to blend is what leads
to our mistakes, our miscalculations, etc. and renders the
whole process of decision-making fallible. This partially
because we find ourselves before dilemmas such as the one
in this question: should the ‘ideal’ humanoid have all the
weakness man has? Do people need to be more machine-
like?
Today it is clear that a certain number of values are
perceived by at least some people as lost. According to
Mukherjee (2007) of the Centre for Human Values at the
Indian Institute of Management in Calcutta, the distinction
between necessity and luxury has been greatly blurred by
the effects of globalisation. He states that ‘human con-
sciousness is spellbound at the marvels of modern tech-
nology […]. Caught as if in a trance, in the maze of
1 Bostrom’s article culminates in a ‘‘Table of Transhumanist
Values’’, cf. Bostrom (2005), ‘‘Transhumanist Values’’, Journal of
Philosophical Research, Special Supplement on ‘Ethical Issues for
the Twenty-First Century’, p. 13.
2 ‘‘The realm of posthuman values does not entail that we should
forego our current values. The posthuman values can be our current
values, albeit ones that we have not yet clearly comprehended.
Transhumanism does not require us to say that we should favour
posthuman beings or human beings, but that the right of way of
favouring human beings is by enabling us to realise our ideals better
and that some of our ideals may well be located outside the space of
modes of being that are accessible to us with our current biological
constitution’’. Cf. BOSTROM N., ibidem, p. 8.
ceaseless activity at an alarming pace, hardly do we feel the
need or urgency to reflect on such deeper questions as
the purpose of life and the meaning of our actions.’3 The
‘religion’ of simulating or modifying oneself will be the
inspiration of a grassroots industry, if it is not already. I do
hope to have provided elements essential to engaging
dialogue on the higher-order matters herein addressed;
taking action in the future depends on the knowledge we
are able to create through dialogue. Grassroots industry
based on a religion of simulating or modifying oneself
obviously entails that one transcends the opposing stand-
points presented here: either being for or against modifi-
cations to elements that do not originate in the initial
material used, for example, injecting human entities into
the machine or injecting mechanistic entities into the
human body (cf. the writings of Warwick 2004). New
forms of organisations need to be driven by vigilance either
to protect the unchanged or to accompany the being,
whatever he, she or it is through the modifications.
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